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Abstract 
The education policies introduced in the rural areas of China following the end of the 
‘cultural revolution’ resulted in an improved provision of educational institutions along with 
better quality teachers which increased the educational attainment of young rural migrants 
and raised their career aspirations. This paper uses data from the Rural-Urban Migration in 
China (RUMiC) dataset for 2009, in a novel examination of the wage returns to schooling for 
young and old generations of rural-migrant and urban workers in order to ascertain whether 
the improved schooling has led to better outcomes.  Another novel feature is the examination 
of the wage returns to over-, required and under-education. We find evidence that the wage 
return to schooling for young rural-to-urban migrants is larger than that for older migrant 
workers and that the return to schooling for young urban residents is lower than that of older 
workers. There is evidence of young migrants receiving a wage premium where they are 
overeducated for their job. 
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1. Introduction 
The extremely large rates of economic growth in China over the past thirty years has 
been well documented (World Bank 2015). China has accomplished its high rate of economic 
growth with the aid of rural-to-urban migrants, a group of individuals who have relocated 
from rural areas to the cities, and who have increased the productivity of the labour-force 
over the past three decades (Zhang and Song, 2003; Wang et al., 2013; Liang et al., 2014; Li 
and Freeman, 2015). China’s urbanization policies have allowed some 260 million rural 
migrants to move from agriculture to more productive activities (World Bank et al., 2014). 
The large increase in rural-to-urban migration is demonstrated in figure 1, where it can be 
seen that there were steady yearly increases in migration from 1988 to 1998 and then a series 
of larger increases thereafter. More recently, the increase in migration has slowed. 
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
A key motivation for rural residents in China to migrate to the cities has been the higher wage 
rates that are available to city workers, compared to those available in rural areas. Zhang and 
Song (2003) find the direction of causality to run from economic growth to migration, 
implying that it is the economic incentive from growth which attracts rural migrants to the 
cities. The higher wage rates in the cities have led to wide rural-urban income inequality 
(Shorrocks and Wan, 2005; De Brauw and Rozelle, 2008), which is also a common feature in 
many other developing countries.  The income disparity in China, both across regions and 
more recently within cities, has been exacerbated by the household registration system, or 
‘hukou’, which has meant that rural-migrants have been denied access to public services such 
as housing, social services and health services. The hukou system was established in the cities 
in 1951 and extended to rural areas in 1955 in order to control internal migration. Consisting 
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of two parts; the residential location, i.e. whether rural or urban, and the socioeconomic 
eligibility, i.e. whether agricultural or non-agricultural (Chan and Zhang 1999), the hukou 
system has naturally restricted rural-to-rural and urban-to-urban migration (Zhao 2004). 
However, since the start of the millennium, and following the relaxation of some of the 
regulations of the hukou, including the introduction of two special types of residential 
registration (Liu, 2005), China’s urban labour markets have witnessed a phenomenal influx of 
rural-migrants. These migrants are on average more educated than their predecessors, 
although less educated than urban workers, and arguably, they have migrated in search of 
long-term economic benefits from their education in order to seek successful lifetime careers 
rather than short-term gains from higher wages. Young migrant workers’ skills and abilities 
should be rewarded in the labour market with job opportunities appropriate for their abilities 
and remuneration packages equal to those of urban residents i.e. without discrimination from 
a system introduced during a completely different political and cultural era. 
In this paper we examine the changes that have occurred in the educational system and in 
the labour market in China since the end of the Mao era. We examine the return to education 
for both urban residents and rural-to-urban migrants and following our argument concerning 
the differences in the young and older generations of migrant workers, a novel feature of this 
paper is that we focus on the difference in wage returns to schooling for these two groups. 
Given the higher average level of education held by younger rural migrants compared to 
older migrants, we hypothesise that this leads to a higher probability of the former group 
being over-educated for their occupation, especially so as discrimination from the hukou 
system is still faced by all migrants. To investigate this possibility, another novel feature of 
this paper is that we examine the over- and under-education of young and old generations of 
rural-to-urban migrants and urban workers, which extends the current economic literature on 
migrants in China.  
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We proceed by providing some background of the educational system and the labour 
market faced by migrants over time in China in the following section, in order to explain the 
large difference in educational opportunities between the generations of migrants and we 
review the current literature. In section 3 our data and econometric methodology are 
discussed. In section 4 we discuss our results and we draw our conclusions in section 5. 
 
2. Background 
2.1. The Education system in China 
The current Chinese educational system is similar in nature to the US, with six years of 
primary education, six years middle school followed by tertiary education, which may be 
between 2-4 years depending on whether the course is academic or vocational in nature and 
then postgraduate study (Treiman, 2013). However, the Chinese education system has 
undergone major upheaval over time which affected the educational opportunities and 
attainment of individuals, especially for those residing in rural areas. In particular, Chairman 
Mao’s ‘Cultural Revolution’ between 1966 and 1976, caused massive disruption to the 
education of young people in rural area. At this time many new schools opened in rural 
provinces with poor quality teachers, hired on their political attitude rather than their quality 
(Treiman, 2013).  In tandem with Mao’s schools policy, the introduction of the ‘family 
responsibility system’ in the rural areas meant that farmers were now allowed to sell surplus 
grain on the open market, which meant that the opportunity cost of children being in school 
rose sharply because they could be more productive working on the family farm (Tsui, 1997). 
Hence, the average education of rural residents was far below that of urban residents.  After 
1977, the schools plan of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ was reversed and schools policy focussed 
on hiring quality teachers and promoting a good education. Tertiary education expanded 
rapidly from 1999 following the Chinese Ministry of Education’s ‘Action Plan of Education 
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Promotion for the 21
st
 Century’, in 1998, alongside the Chinese government’s Plan for 
‘Revitalizing Education in the Twenty-First Century’ (Wan, 2006; Yeung, 2012; Treiman, 
2013). Figures show that between 1999 and 2011 there was a fourfold increase in the number 
of young people in higher education, from 1.55 million to 6.82 million (China Statistical 
database).  Given the extreme changes to the education system in China, especially in the 
rural areas, it is evident why younger workers, the ‘new generation’ of migrant workers, are 
considered to be more educated than the ‘old generation’. 
 
2.2 The Labour market in China 
Typically, before the start of the start of the new millennium, rural-to-urban migrant 
workers were strictly restricted to low skilled, low status and low-paying jobs or those 
referred to as ‘3D’ jobs (dirty, dangerous and demanding), which would not require a high 
level of education (Meng and Zhang, 2001). Early labour policies which encouraged migrants 
to the cities largely ignored the problems faced by migrants due to the restrictions of the 
hukou, which meant that employers took advantage of the temporary contract rural-to-urban 
migrants. Many local governments required urban business firms, both state owned and 
privately owned, to hire permanent staff only from local residents (Liu, 2005). 
Since the new millennium the Chinese government has recognised the economic benefits 
to be gained from more-educated workers and has introduced new labour policies. For 
example, in January 2008 China’s new Labour Contract Law came into effect which 
protected migrant workers’ rights, including the right to a labour contract, social insurance 
and minimum wages (see Li and Freeman 2015, for an assessment of the effect of this Law 
on China’s rural-urban migrant population). Urbanisation policy was introduced in 2001 to 
guide rural migrants to work in small and medium towns (usually close to their home) rather 
than in large cities like Beijing and Shanghai. Several policies and initiatives were put into 
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place, such as the Spring Wind Action Program in 2008 that encouraged rural migrants to 
work in their local provinces or small cities rather than relocating to the larger cities. 
Additionally, the local government authorities’ budgets in the local provinces were increased 
in to enable them to finance retraining programmes for return migrants to improve their skill 
levels (Wang et al., 2013). However, the so-called new-generation of migrant workers are 
“not familiar with farming and are dying to be part of the city life” (Cao and Lin, 2010).  
Recently, China’s large economic growth, whilst still large when compared to developed 
nations such as the UK or the USA, has shown evidence of a slowdown, falling to 6.8% in 
the fourth quarter of 2015 (Wall Street Journal, 19 January, 2016). The provision of a high-
quality education for all Chinese citizens, whether urban or rural residents, and their 
subsequent assignment to employment which matches their ability, along with further on-the-
job-training is paramount for sustained economic growth in China. As China’s urbanization 
program expands, greater numbers of highly-educated young talent are required to meet the 
demands of a fast-growing and technically biased labour market.   
 
2.3 Literature 
Previous research has found that the returns to education in urban china are larger than those 
in rural China as we would expect given the economic growth in these areas, and typically 
the return to education in urban areas has been found to be increasing over time (Zhang et al., 
2005; Ren and Miller, 2012). Ren and Miller (2012) calculate the difference in the wage 
returns to schooling in rural areas of China between males and females using the ‘Over-
Required-Under educated’ (ORU) framework of Chiswick and Miller (2008), which 
considers the mean level of education for each occupation category as that required for the 
job. They also use the decomposition analysis of Chiswick and Miller (2008) and find that 
there is a greater return to possessing the required education for a job for females compared 
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to males (9.35 percent and 6.35 percent, respectively), which they attribute to the self-
selection of highly motivated females into the labour market. Zhu (2016) using the China 
Household Income Project (CHIP) dataset finds the return to a year of schooling in 2007 for 
urban resident workers and migrant workers to be 4.9% and 4.2%, respectively. Additionally, 
Zhu (2016) finds wage differentials between urban residents and rural migrants to be greatest 
at the top end of the wage distribution. This could be a possibility for older workers due to 
the effect of the disrupted education system outlined above; the difference in the quality of 
schooling in the rural and urban area in China at this time is recognised (Heckman and Li, 
2004; Fu and Ren, 2010). However, young rural migrants, compared to their elders, have had 
a better quality of education and are more likely than their elders to enter higher education in 
an attempt to improve themselves. We can assume that rural-migrant workers in China 
received their education in their home area before migrating because due the hukou system it is 
extremely difficult for migrants’ children to be allowed to attend schools in urban areas 
(Demurger and Xu, 2013).  
Despite their higher education level and aspirations rural-migrants are still discriminated 
against by the hukou system in that they are often restricted to occupations below their education 
level despite choosing to migrate in order to pursue their career and develop new skills (Wang 
2008). Furthermore, job search in China is not as straightforward as in many other countries 
because many workers obtain their job in the urban area through introductions by family 
members (Wang, 2008; De Brauw and Giles, 2008; Liu et al., 2012). The hukou system’s 
discriminatory nature, providing no housing or social services for migrants means that they must 
have a job and means of support on arrival in the city, which it is argued interferes with the job 
search process, interrupting  the efficient allocation of migrant workers to jobs (Meng, 2000). 
This would explain why we often find rural-to-urban workers in temporary employment as they 
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move around and switch jobs in an attempt to support themselves’ whilst they seek a job to match 
with their skills (Zhao, 2004). 
The average growth rate of GDP in China has been over 9% annually since 1999, but the 
growth of the education expansion has been approximately 22% annually (China Statistical 
Database), implying that new entrants into the labour market have had difficulty in obtaining 
a job with the same relative salary and working conditions as their elders who held the same 
qualification. We examine the wage effects from over-education and under-education for 
urban Chinese and for Chinese rural-to-urban migrants. We argue that over-education wage 
penalties will exist for both groups of individuals but that the wage penalties will be greater 
for rural-to urban migrants due in large part to the discrimination faced from the hukou 
system. Additionally, we hypothesise that young rural-urban migrants, whom we term the 
‘young generation’, (that is those aged below 35 and therefore would have started school 
during this education system, after the end of the ‘Cultural revolution’ who are more likely to 
be over-educated for their job than their older counterparts, who spent relatively less time in 
education and who faced education of a poorer quality (Treiman, 2013).  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
The dataset used here is the 2009 Rural-Urban Migration in China (RUMiC), which is a set 
of regional surveys conducted jointly by the Australian National University, the University of 
Queensland and the Beijing Normal University and supported by the Institute for the Study of 
Labour (IZA) in Bonn. The 2009 survey is the most recent and comprehensive dataset that 
focuses on migrant workers in China. The data consists of three separate surveys of which we 
use two: the Urban Household Survey (UHS) and the Migrant Household Survey (MHS). The 
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RUMiC is the ideal dataset for our purpose as it contains rich demographic, educational and 
employment information on urban, rural and migrant workers of all working ages. By 
contrast, the China Health and Retirement study (CHARLs) dataset contains only individuals 
aged 45 and over, and the China Household Income Project survey (CHIP) dataset does not 
include migrant workers
2
. The separate surveys use identical questionnaires which enables an 
economic analysis of each sample in isolation and together. The motivation for analysing the 
separate samples as well as taking them together is that we can see the return to education for 
each group given that, as discussed, the quality of education provided may be different or 
viewed differently by urban employers. In most studies of rural-to-urban migrants it is 
assumed that years of education are equal across areas and over time, which may not be the 
case here. The data for each sample consists of the usual demographic questions, personal 
characteristics, employment type and firm characteristics, along with questions about 
householder’s education.  Descriptive statistics for the samples we utilise are provided in 
Table 1.  
TABLE 1 HERE 
For our analysis of over-education we make use of the question: 
“How many years of formal education have you had (Excluding skipping or failing a 
grade)?” 
Our measure of over-education (under-education) is defined as one standard deviation or 
greater (lower) than the mean education level found in their occupation
3
. The survey asks the 
householder for their highest level of education, which we were able to cross-check with their 
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 The advantages of the RUMiC over other datasets; the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) and the 
China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) is detailed in Akgüç et al (2013). 
3
 Most of those who matriculate also graduate which means that it is possible to use years of schooling to infer 
educational level (Treiman 2013). 
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reported years of schooling. The average years of schooling and qualifications for each of the 
samples are provided in Table 2. The educational level attained is always greater for the 
urban sample than the migrant sample across both age groups, as we expected. 
TABLE 2 HERE 
However, we can also see from Table 2 that the average years of schooling has increased for 
the younger age group in both urban and migrant samples, although consistently we find that 
the average education of migrant workers is lower than that of urban workers. If we consider 
the professions that the individuals in our samples enter, shown in panel A of Table 3, we can 
see that the majority of rural to urban migrants (just less than 45%) enter into the commercial 
and service industries. Across all occupational categories migrants are seen to have a lower 
average of years of education than urban workers.  
TABLE 3 HERE 
Less than a quarter of our migrant sample is found in the clerk or personnel occupations and 
most of the remaining individuals enter into the manufacturing sector. As discussed above, 
migrants are highly unlikely to be found in professional occupations in the cities, possibly 
because of the larger proportion of migrants compared to urban residents who have lower 
than average years of education, especially among the older generation, and partly because of 
the discriminatory nature of the hukou system. Panel B of Table 3 reveals that for each of our 
samples, the average years of education in each occupation category is always greater for the 
new generation compared to the older generation of workers. Examining the average hourly 
wage by industry, shown in Table 4, we can see that urban residents earn more on average 
than migrants in every industry classification. The difference is most pronounced in the 
primary industry, where there are few migrants and also in the financial services and business 
related sector and public service sector; industries where in the past, migrants had difficulty 
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in entering due to their hukou status but which younger, more educated young migrants have 
greater access to. 
TABLE 4 HERE 
Finally, we can see the proportions of young and old generation workers across our samples 
in Table 5. Here we see that in the full sample we have a pretty even split of young and old 
workers, however, there is a difference in the proportion of young and old across the urban 
and rural samples. In the urban sample the older generation of workers account for around 
seventy percent of the workforce whereas the opposite is true for the rural-to urban migrants. 
We believe that the larger proportion of young migrant workers compared to older migrant 
workers is likely to be due to several factors; firstly, the older generation were not as well- 
educated as the younger generation and therefore, less likely to enter permanent or long-
tenure jobs; secondly, the hukou system meant that housing costs were high and with no 
health insurance or social support many rural migrants eventually returned home.
4
  
 
3.2 Methodology 
The theory that underpins our economic analysis of the returns to education and to over and 
under-education in the Chinese labour market is that of Human Capital (Becker 1964). Two 
estimation methods are used to examine the returns to education for both native urban 
residents and rural-to urban migrant workers. First, a Mincerian earnings function is 
estimated separately for each of our samples, which provides the wage returns to schooling 
among urban native workers, rural-to-urban migrant workers, and then estimated together. By 
estimating OLS for each sample we seek to examine whether there are differences in the 
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 For literature on the return migration in China see (Zhao, 2002; Dustmann, 2003). 
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estimated return to years of schooling for migrants between the migrant and full sample. The 
estimating equation is given as:  
 
iikkii XSY   00       (1) 
where iY is the logged deflated gross hourly wage. iS is the completed years of schooling, and 
Xik is a vector of k control variables that are known to influence earnings, including  personal 
characteristics (age, age squared, male, married), and job characteristics (industry, firm 
ownership, firm size and job type) and province. We include tenure in the job and its square 
as an attempt to capture experience in the position and which we would expect to have a 
positive effect on the wage and also a young dummy variable to capture any difference across 
the generations. We hypothesise that the young generation, working in a growing economy 
are more likely to receive greater wage returns. In order to ascertain whether the wage returns 
to schooling are different between older and younger workers, especially since there have 
been many reforms to the education system in China and especially so in the rural areas, we 
re-estimate our equation and include interaction terms between years of schooling and being 
young (defined here as aged below 35). 
Our second estimation strategy is to examine the returns to over-education and under-
education. As stated in the data section above, we measure the incidence of over-education 
(under-education) in each of our samples using the realised match method (Hartog, 2000) and 
calculate the mean level of education as the mean number of years of education within each 
occupation category. For each sample we estimate the ‘over-required, required and over-
required’ (ORU) specification (Duncan and Hoffman, 1981; Hartog, 2000; Lenton, 2012), 
where required education is measured as the mean years of education found within each 
occupation. The earnings equation is given as: 
 i
UOR
ikki SSSXY   321     (2) 
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For our full sample we include a dummy variable to capture whether the respondent is a 
migrant worker. Here again we estimate models which include interaction terms between 
being young and either with the required education, being overeducated or being 
undereducated to ascertain if there are any significant differences between the young and 
older workers. Our 3 samples, urban, migrant and full sample contain wage information from 
the urban labour market but as discussed above, these two groups, it is argued faced different 
education systems, especially the older generation of migrants. The realised-matches method 
of measuring the incidence of over-education we utilise here uses the mean level of education 
of individuals within an occupation and therefore is naturally sensitive to the sample of 
individuals. For this reason we make use of separate measures, for each of our samples. In 
this way we can examine whether an urban individual is over- or under-educated compared to 
their comparison group of urban residents. The same rationale is applied for the migrant 
sample and finally, examining the full sample enables us to see the difference between the 
groups where the migrant group are faced with discrimination from the hukou system. 
 
4. Results 
The results from our earnings equations are shown in Table 6. The return to a year of 
schooling in our full sample is found to be 5.2%. However, the return is larger for urban 
residents at 5.6% compared to 3.1% for rural migrants; these wage returns are similar to those 
found by Zhu (2016) who analysed 2007 CHIP data. In both of our separate samples 
(columns 2 and 3) we find similarities across covariates, for example, experience (proxied 
here by tenure), working in a large firm with over 100 employees, and on a permanent or 
long-term contract increases the wage return. The wage return is largest in Guangdong 
province as demonstrated by the negative coefficients on all province dummy variables. In 
our full sample (column 1) however, we see a huge negative effect on the wage return from 
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being a rural migrant, which implies that migrants face a 22% wage penalty compared to 
urban residents. We consider that this huge wage penalty is due in large part to the 
discriminating effects of the hukou system. Despite efforts by the Chinese government to 
relax some of the restrictions forced upon rural-migrants from the hukou system (Chan 2009) 
it is clear that wide-ranging discrimination remains. As we have seen in Table 3, urban 
residents are more likely than rural residents to be found in the top occupations. With respect 
to our ‘young’ dummy we find that being aged below 35 years old increases the wage return 
for migrants, yet it is insignificant for urban workers (Table 6 columns 2 and 3). This variable 
is also significantly positive for our full sample (column 1). We hypothesise that young 
migrant workers have benefitted from the relaxation of some of the restrictions of the hukou 
system
5
, and are more likely to enter better quality jobs and receive a higher wage return to 
their education than their older counterparts who had the same level of education. To 
investigate this hypothesis we re-estimate the wage equation for all samples including an 
interaction term for schooling and young. The results for our variables of interest
6
 are 
reported in Table 7, where our results support our hypothesis that the wage return to 
schooling is greater for young rural migrants than for older migrants. The wage return to 
schooling for migrants is just above 2 percent but this increases by around a further 2 
percentage points for each year of schooling a young rural migrant possesses, results which 
are highly statistically significant. Furthermore, for urban residents we now see a significant 
wage premium for being young but the interaction with schooling implies a reduction in the 
wage to schooling for the young generation compared to the older generation. This result is 
highly statistically significant and a novel finding in the literature. We speculate that the 
                                                          
5
 From 1979 to 1997 the non-agricultural hukou population grew at an average of 7.8 million per year, or 3.7%, 
compared to an average of 2.5 million or 1.9% per year in the period between 1963 and 1978 (Chan and Zhang, 
1999). 
6
 All coefficients on the other independent variables did not change from those reported in Table 6. The full set 
of results is available from the authors on request. 
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increase in young educated rural migrants competing in the urban labour market has 
increased the supply of productive workers leading to a slight fall in the wage return for 
young urban residents. 
We now turn to the results from our ORU equation (equation 2), which shown in Table 
8. The results for the full sample (in column 1) conform to the predictions for the ORU model 
(Duncan and Hoffman, 1981) in that the wage return is greatest for those who are in a 
matched job with the required education level. The returns to over-education are also positive 
and statistically significant although below those of those with the required education and the 
returns to under-education are statistically significant and negative.  Our young generation of 
workers, as we predict, have a positive wage coefficient. However, there is a large negative 
and statistically significant coefficient on the dummy variable for migrant workers; once 
again we believe that this strong result implies that there is still a large amount of 
discrimination against rural-migrant workers. The problems associated with the hukou system 
leading to migrants being forced to take temporary jobs to support themselves’, has been 
claimed to be a large part of the explanation for wage inequality (Zhao 2004), but we have 
controlled for temporary jobs (short term) in our estimation strategy. In Western labour 
markets this explanation for a mismatch between workers and their job would imply that the 
over-education of migrant workers is merely transitory whilst they seek a job that matches 
with their education level. However, given the apparent high level of discrimination against 
rural-migrant workers in China this over-education may be more permanent. Indeed, our 
findings suggest that being over-educated for one’s job may be the ‘norm’ for young migrant 
workers. 
Turning to the results from our urban sample (column 2) we see that our results here also 
conform to the results found in the ORU literature (Duncan and Hoffman, 1981), with urban 
residents enjoying the greatest wage return where they possess the required education for 
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their job. The coefficient shows that urban residents who possess the required schooling for 
their job earn an extremely large wage premium of around 15%. There is a small but positive 
return to over-education of around 3% and a wage penalty to being under-educated of around 
4%. The young generation of urban workers earn a wage premium of around 7% compared to 
their older counterparts which, we believe may be due to the more favourable labour market 
conditions and economic climate faced by the young generation at the time they entered the 
labour market. The tenure of the current job which captures experience also reveals a positive 
wage premium of around 3%. 
The results of our ORU model for migrants (Table 8, column 3), reveals a departure from 
the usual results found in the literature for this model. Here migrant workers have a small 
significant return to possessing the required education for their job, however, there is a larger 
statistically significant return of around 4% where the migrant worker is overeducated. We 
believe this positive finding implies that only the rural migrants who have the greatest years 
of schooling, and who are most likely to be of high ability, are successful in the urban labour 
market compared to their peers. The coefficient on young shows a wage premium of around 
14% compared to their older counterparts and we believe this is driven by their better quality 
of education. There is also a negative effect from being under-educated which is significant 
and confirms to the literature. Similar to the urban and full samples, the positive wage effects 
from being male, experience in the job and being employed in a large firm are present.  
Finally we turn to the results of our interactions of young with over- required- and under-
education which are reported in Table 9.  We find statistically significant results which imply 
that correctly matched young urban workers (column 2) receive a return of around 3% less 
than their correctly matched elders, whilst correctly matched young migrant workers (column 
3) receive a return of around 7% more than their correctly matched elders. These results 
accord with our earlier results from the wage equation (equation 1), suggesting the robustness 
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of these findings. We suggest that younger workers may be required to possess a higher level 
of education to cope with the higher level of technological change as China has grown 
economically and suggest this is an area for further research. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has investigated the wage returns to urban residents and rural-to-urban migrants in 
China. A novel feature of this analysis is that we consider the difference between the young 
generation, whom we class as aged 34 or below and the older generation. We consider the 
quantity, and indirectly the quality of education undertaken by the two generations of rural 
migrants as there are major differences between the two. The young generation of rural 
migrants have more education and are more likely to be found in better quality jobs than their 
older counterparts. China, like all nations, is dependent on a well-educated highly skilled 
labour force for continued economic growth. We have found evidence that the wage-return to 
schooling has shown a small but significant increase for the young generation of migrants 
compared to their older counterparts and whereas there is a slight fall in the wage return to 
schooling for young urban residents compared to their older counterparts. However, whilst 
the average educational quality, of young rural-migrants is higher than that of their older 
counterparts we find evidence suggestive of large discrimination effects against migrants, 
which we believe is from the hukou system. In spite of the Chinese government’s efforts to 
encourage migration by relaxing some of the restrictions of the hukou system faced by 
migrants (Chan, 2009), which has seen a rise in internal migration since the turn of the 
millennium, it appears that the transition to the urban labour market is still problematic for 
these workers. The hukou in an economic sense acts as an administrative barrier to work 
(World Bank et al., 2014).  Finally, we have examined the over- under- and required 
education of both urban residents and migrants. In our migrant sample, it appears that there 
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are larger positive wage returns to being over-educated than correctly educated. However, 
interaction terms show there is a large premium to being a young migrant and possessing the 
correct education for the job compared to the correctly matched older generation. The urban 
sample, however, reveals a slight fall in the wage return to possessing the correct education 
for the job for young people compared to the correctly educated older generation. These 
results are strongly indicative of the educational success of young migrant workers, who are 
catching up with their urban counterparts in the urban Labour market. If China is to sustain 
its level of economic growth it needs to ensure there are no barriers to mobility across urban 
areas and to ensure that skilled workers are able to obtain permanent jobs which match with 
their skills. Furthermore, all able workers, not just urban residents, should be able to access 
permanent employment that provides on-the-job training. Young Migrant workers, we argue, 
are vital for China’s economic growth. By promoting competency-based technical and 
vocational education and training and reforming the tertiary education system to focus on 
increasing the labour market relevance of higher education would bring positive returns 
(World Bank et al., 2014). 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics. 
 
 
 
Full sample  Urban sample Migrants sample  
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Log hourly wage 2.292 0.725 2.517 0.739 1.892 0.490 
Years of schooling 11.387 3.465 12.505 3.253 9.400 2.892 
Over-educated 0.116 0.320 0.107 0.309 0.118 0.323 
Under-educated 0.112 0.315 0.125 0.331 0.130 0.336 
Years of required education  11.387 1.502 12.505 1.229 9.400 0.499 
Years of over-education  0.600 1.858 0.554 1.879 0.511 1.461 
Years of under-education  0.589 1.790 0.575 1.601 0.671 1.916 
Age 36.709 11.068 40.487 9.754 29.992 10.034 
Age square 1470.04 836.748 1734.296 792.810 1000.17 694.722 
Young (age<35 years old) 0.447 0.497 0.305 0.460 0.698 0.459 
Male 0.571 0.495 0.559 0.497 0.592 0.491 
Married 0.715 0.451 0.836 0.370 0.501 0.500 
Minority 0.989 0.105 0.990 0.098 0.986 0.117 
Tenure of current job 9.421 10.210 13.002 10.891 3.053 3.919 
Tenure square 192.983 338.998 287.643 389.373 24.670 73.695 
Migrants dummy 0.360 0.480     
Industry       
Agriculture, forestry and related 0.005 0.070 0.007 0.086 0.001 0.025 
Manufacture, production and 
construction 
0.301 0.459 0.261 0.439 0.371 0.483 
Information Transmission and 
Transportation 
0.101 0.301 0.137 0.344 0.035 0.184 
Finance and Business 0.088 0.284 0.095 0.293 0.076 0.265 
Public 0.194 0.396 0.259 0.438 0.080 0.271 
Services 0.311 0.463 0.240 0.427 0.437 0.496 
Occupation       
Principals in State Agencies, 
enterprises and public service 
0.039 0.193 0.059 0.235 0.004 0.060 
Professional technicians 0.156 0.363 0.242 0.428 0.004 0.062 
Clerk and relating personnel 0.260 0.439 0.268 0.443 0.246 0.431 
Commercial and service personnel 0.290 0.454 0.205 0.404 0.442 0.497 
Manufacturing and transport related  0.209 0.407 0.157 0.363 0.304 0.460 
Agriculture, Soldier and others 0.045 0.208 0.070 0.255 0.001 0.035 
Ownership       
State enterprise 0.471 0.499 0.649 0.477 0.156 0.363 
Firm size       
Firm size 1(1 to 5 employees) 0.067 0.250 0.049 0.216 0.099 0.298 
Firm size 2 (6 to 20 employees) 0.183 0.387 0.169 0.375 0.207 0.405 
Firm size 3 (21 to 99 employees) 0.299 0.458 0.287 0.452 0.320 0.467 
Firm size 4 (100 and over employees) 0.451 0.498 0.495 0.500 0.374 0.484 
Job type       
Permanent 0.267 0.443 0.340 0.474 0.138 0.345 
Long term 0.471 0.499 0.500 0.500 0.420 0.494 
Short term 0.072 0.258 0.042 0.201 0.124 0.330 
Other 0.188 0.391 0.115 0.319 0.318 0.466 
Province       
Guangdong 0.181 0.385 0.152 0.359 0.232 0.422 
Henan 0.097 0.297 0.113 0.317 0.069 0.254 
Anhui 0.099 0.299 0.110 0.313 0.081 0.273 
Chongqing 0.080 0.272 0.079 0.270 0.083 0.275 
Shanghai 0.108 0.310 0.124 0.329 0.079 0.270 
Jiangsu 0.124 0.329 0.112 0.315 0.145 0.352 
Zhejiang 0.124 0.329 0.109 0.311 0.151 0.358 
Hubei 0.082 0.275 0.084 0.277 0.080 0.271 
Sichuan 0.104 0.306 0.118 0.322 0.080 0.272 
Total  9251 5921 3330 
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Table 2: Average years of schooling and highest educational level. 
Variables Full sample Urban sample Migrant sample 
Average years of schooling  11.387 12.505 9.400 
Average years of schooling (young)16-34 years old 11.900 14.254 10.072 
Average years of schooling (old) 35- 60 years old 10.974 11.739 7.842 
Highest educational level    
Primary or less 512 (5.53%) 112 (1.89%) 400 (12.01%) 
Junior middle school 2567 (27.75%) 947(15.99%) 1620 (48.65%) 
Senior middle school 2152 (23.26%) 1491 (25.18%) 661 (19.85%) 
Vocational school 1032 (11.16%) 626 (10.57%) 406 (12.19%) 
College/Undergraduate or higher 2988 (32.30%) 2745 (46.36%) 243 (7.30%) 
Total 9251 5921 3330 
 
 
Table 3: Mean years of education by occupation for each sample and each generation. 
Panel A Full sample Urban sample  Migrant sample 
Occupation N 
Mean years 
Education 
N 
Mean years 
Education 
N 
Mean years 
Education 
Principals in State Agencies, Party 
organisations 
359 
(3.88%)  
13.80 347 
(5.86%) 
13.95 12 
(0.36%) 
9.25 
Professional technicians 
1446  
(15.63%) 
13.98 1433 
(24.20%)  
13.99 13 
(0.39%) 
13.15 
Clerk and relating personnel 
2403  
(25.98%) 
12.01 1585 
(26.77%)  
12.99 818 
(24.56%) 
10.12 
Commercial and service personnel 
2686  
(29.03%) 
10.24 1214  
(20.50%) 
11.40 1472 
(44.20%) 
9.28 
Manufacturing and transporting 
equipment 
1938 
(20.95%) 
9.85 927 
(15.66%) 
10.82 1011 
(30.36%) 
8.96 
Agriculture, Solider and Other  
419 
(4.53%) 
11.28 415  
(7.01%) 
11.31 4 
 (0.12%) 
8.25 
Total 9251 11.39 5921 12.51 3330 9.40 
Panel B: Mean years of education by generation     
 Old Young Old Young Old Young 
Principals in State Agencies 13.56 14.89 13.67 15.40 8.50 10.00 
Professional technicians 13.32 15.15 13.32 15.19 13.25 13.11 
Clerk and relating personnel 11.50 12.60 12.10 14.74 8.73 10.66 
Commercial and service personnel 9.43 10.88 10.44 13.27 7.34 9.97 
Manufacturing and transport  9.52 10.30 10.40 12.58 7.75 9.66 
Agriculture, Solider and Other  10.55 13.30 10.57 13.36 6.50 10.00 
Total 10.97 11.90 11.74 14.25 7.84 10.72 
 
Table 4: Average hourly wages, in yuan, by industry.  
 
Broad sectors Full sample Urban sample Migrant sample 
 wage Freq % wage Freq % wage Freq % 
First Industry 25.667 0.50 26.540 0.74 6.473 0.06 
Second Industry  12.506 30.09 15.976 26.13 8.167 37.15 
Information and Transportation  16.772 10.05 18.035 13.73 7.989 3.51 
Finance and Business 17.322 8.82 21.599 9.51 7.805 7.60 
Public services 19.369 19.42 21.509 25.86 7.054 7.99 
Service Industry 9.257 31.11 11.621 24.03 6.945 43.69 
Total  13.748   100 17.256 100 7.509 100 
Wages given in yuan, in constant prices. 
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Table 5: Number of observations by age group.  
 
Age groups Full sample  Urban sample  Migrants sample  
16-34 years old  4131(44.65%) 1805 (30.48%) 2326 (69.85%) 
35-60 years old  5120 (55.35%) 4116 (69.52%) 1004 (30.15%) 
Total  9251 5921 3330 
 
Table 6:  Returns to schooling: Mincerian wage equation. 
Variables Full sample Urban sample Migrants sample 
Years of schooling 0.052*** 0.056*** 0.031*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Migrant dummy -0.222***   
 (0.017)   
Young (age<35 years old) 0.090*** 0.056 0.132*** 
 (0.023) (0.034) (0.030) 
male 0.159*** 0.176*** 0.132*** 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) 
Married 0.056*** 0.058** -0.011 
 (0.018) (0.025) (0.021) 
Minority 0.101* 0.042 0.102* 
 (0.053) (0.077) (0.061) 
age 0.026*** 0.021** 0.056*** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) 
Age square -0.000*** -0.000** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure of current job 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.033*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Tenure square -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
State enterprises 0.004 -0.030 0.013 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.021) 
Agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry 0.357*** 0.378*** -0.041 
 (0.080) (0.088) (0.289) 
Manufacture, production and construction 0.070*** 0.106*** 0.054*** 
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.019) 
Information Transmission &Transportation 0.143*** 0.185*** 0.042 
 (0.022) (0.027) (0.040) 
Finance and Business 0.168*** 0.275*** -0.005 
 (0.022) (0.029) (0.029) 
Public 0.188*** 0.257*** -0.039 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.029) 
Firm size 1 (1 to 5 employees) -0.179*** -0.162*** -0.164*** 
 (0.025) (0.039) (0.028) 
Firm size 2 (6 to 20 employees) -0.114*** -0.148*** -0.068*** 
 (0.017) (0.023) (0.022) 
Firm size 3 (21 to 99 employees) -0.009 -0.036** 0.009 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) 
Permanent 0.252*** 0.425*** 0.066*** 
 (0.020) (0.032) (0.024) 
Long term 0.126*** 0.249*** 0.116*** 
 (0.017) (0.027) (0.019) 
Short term 0.011 -0.041 0.067*** 
 (0.025) (0.043) (0.025) 
Henan -0.601*** -0.777*** -0.349*** 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.032) 
Anhui -0.570*** -0.762*** -0.341*** 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.030) 
Chongqing -0.497*** -0.634*** -0.384*** 
 (0.024) (0.033) (0.030) 
Shanghai -0.043** -0.156*** -0.030 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.030) 
Jiangsu -0.277*** -0.451*** -0.102*** 
 (0.021) (0.030) (0.025) 
Zhejiang -0.147*** -0.252*** -0.089*** 
 (0.021) (0.030) (0.024) 
Hubei -0.432*** -0.536*** -0.351*** 
 (0.023) (0.032) (0.029) 
Sichuan -0.409*** -0.593*** -0.185*** 
 (0.022) (0.029) (0.030) 
Constant 0.976*** 1.080*** 0.439*** 
 (0.123) (0.229) (0.127) 
    
Observations             9251            5921             3330 
R2 0.464 0.403 0.317 
Note: 1. Base groups include Service sector industry; firm size of more than 100 employees and.in Guangdong province. 
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Table 7:  Returns to schooling: young and schooling interactions. 
Variables Full sample Urban sample Migrants sample 
Years of schooling 0.056*** 0.060*** 0.023*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Migrant dummy -0.229***   
 (0.017)   
Young (age<35 years old) 0.215*** 0.237*** -0.006 
 (0.050) (0.086) (0.059) 
Young * Years of schooling -0.010*** -0.013** 0.015*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Observations             9251            5921             3330 
R2 0.465 0.403 0.319 
 
Table 8: Returns to required education, over-education and under-education.  
Variables Full sample Urban sample Migrant sample 
Years of required education 0.105*** 0.151*** 0.028* 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.016) 
Years of over-education 0.040*** 0.031*** 0.040*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Years of under-education -0.029*** -0.042*** -0.020*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
Migrant dummy -0.248***   
 (0.017)   
Young (age<35 years old) 0.103*** 0.073** 0.138*** 
 (0.023) (0.034) (0.031) 
male 0.153*** 0.185*** 0.133*** 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) 
Married 0.043** 0.038 -0.011 
 (0.018) (0.025) (0.022) 
Minority 0.107** 0.034 0.108* 
 (0.053) (0.076) (0.061) 
age 0.028*** 0.024** 0.054*** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) 
Age square -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure of current job 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.034*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Tenure square -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
State enterprises -0.000 -0.040** 0.012 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.021) 
Agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry 0.312*** 0.352*** -0.083 
 (0.080) (0.087) (0.291) 
Manufacture, production and construction 0.067*** 0.092*** 0.044** 
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.019) 
Information Transmission and Transportation 0.136*** 0.170*** 0.031 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.040) 
Finance and Business 0.131*** 0.258*** -0.012 
 (0.022) (0.029) (0.030) 
Public 0.136*** 0.192*** -0.044 
 (0.019) (0.024) (0.029) 
Firm size 1 (1 to 5 employees) -0.175*** -0.156*** -0.160*** 
 (0.025) (0.039) (0.028) 
Firm size 2 (6 to 20 employees) -0.115*** -0.155*** -0.066*** 
 (0.017) (0.023) (0.022) 
Firm size 3 (21 to 99 employees) -0.016 -0.050*** 0.011 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.019) 
Permanent 0.252*** 0.416*** 0.068*** 
 (0.020) (0.032) (0.024) 
Long term 0.130*** 0.241*** 0.126*** 
 (0.017) (0.027) (0.019) 
Short term 0.017 -0.035 0.073*** 
 (0.025) (0.043) (0.025) 
Henan -0.588*** -0.752*** -0.360*** 
 (0.023) (0.030) (0.032) 
Anhui -0.557*** -0.749*** -0.352*** 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.030) 
Chongqing -0.472*** -0.590*** -0.375*** 
 (0.024) (0.033) (0.030) 
Shanghai -0.017 -0.141*** -0.040 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.030) 
Jiangsu -0.260*** -0.449*** -0.104*** 
 (0.021) (0.030) (0.025) 
Zhejiang -0.152*** -0.265*** -0.099*** 
 (0.021) (0.030) (0.024) 
Hubei -0.415*** -0.532*** -0.345*** 
 (0.023) (0.032) (0.030) 
Sichuan -0.388*** -0.591*** -0.178*** 
 (0.022) (0.029) (0.030) 
Constant 0.400*** -0.039 0.495*** 
 (0.130) (0.239) (0.194) 
Observations        9251      5921       3330 
R2 0.467 0.417 0.310 
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Table 9: Returns to required, over-education and under-education: young interactions. 
Variables Full sample Urban sample Migrant sample 
Years of required education 0.120*** 0.159*** -0.019 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.027) 
Years of over-education 0.040*** 0.034*** 0.060*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.014) 
Years of under-education -0.029*** -0.045*** -0.012** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Migrant dummy -0.259***   
 (0.017)   
Young (age<35 years old) 0.571*** 0.435** -0.482 
 (0.098) (0.180) (0.296) 
Young* years required education -0.040*** -0.029** 0.069** 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.031) 
Young* years over-education -0.001 -0.007 -0.024 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.015) 
Young* years under-education 0.001 0.049** -0.025*** 
 (0.008) (0.020) (0.009) 
    
Observations        9251        5921      3330 
R2 0.468 0.418 0.313 
 
 
 
